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Abstract: 
In this chapter, we study under which conditions dyadic federations – a genus of multinational federalism 
composed of two major communities – have ‘succeeded’ (i.e., survived) and under which they have ‘failed’ 
(i.e., broken apart). Through a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of all democratic dyadic 
federations, past and present, we show that dyadic federations can succeed if geographical factors such as the 
territorial dispersion of the dominant groups play in its favour and when institutional arrangements (i.e., a 
proportional electoral system or a national party system) ensure fair political representation for both 
communities or prevent polities from being conceived in exclusively sub-national terms. In the absence of 
territorial dispersion, other institutional arrangements such as executive inclusiveness and an equal economic 
distribution between groups appear to be crucial in preventing the breakup. In general, dyadic federations 
that survive tend to do so for many years. By contrast, our analysis shows that a bipolar federal project is 
likely to fail in the absence of stabilising institutional arrangements (i.e., electoral proportionality and a 
national party system) and, more particularly, when economic resources are unequally distributed between 
communities and when these communities are clearly territorially separable. The duration of the union is, 
again, of importance because the dyadic federations that failed did so at their very beginning. Our results 
inform the literature on federalism, national diversity and democracy by showing that federalism can be a 
successful institutional arrangement for bipolar polities when its survival as a state is desired or without a 
viable alternative. 
 
Keywords: dyadic federations; bipolar federalism; divided societies; multi-nationalism; qualitative 
comparative analysis. 
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Introduction 
 
The dynamics of dyadic federations have proven to be of particular interest to scholars of 
federalism. One of the first among them to pay close attention to this type of federation was Ivo 
Duchacek (1988, p. 5) who, thirty years ago in a special issue of Publius, defined dyadic 
federations as “societies and polities in which two distinct communities clearly dominate the 
political arena”. Since then most of the scholarship on dyadic federations has pinpointed the 
tensions that these federations often embody. For example,  Ronald Watts (2008, p. 184) 
identifies these ‘two-unit federations’ as one of the ‘pathologies of federalism’ and argues that 
“the experience of bipolar or dyadic federal systems is not encouraging”.  At first blush, this 
scepticism would seem valid given the social and political dualism of dyadic federalism and 
the absence of relations with multiple constituent units, both of which are factors that can often 
lead to institutional deadlock and to societal confrontation (Schmitt, 1991). However, while 
several dyadic federations have indeed broken up, there is also clear evidence that, as of today, 
many dyadic federations have survived and even attained some degree of political stability. 
Consequently, the success of dyadic federations presents us with a compelling puzzle as well 
as a comparative question in need of an answer: how is it that some dyadic federations have 
succeeded (i.e., survived), while others have failed (i.e., broken apart)? 
To be sure, there is research on the political dynamics of both successful and failed 
dyadic federations, however this research mostly entails single case studies or small-n 
comparisons (e.g., Milne 1988, Innes 1997, Singh 2008) and there has been but one 
comprehensive comparison of a large number of cases and political realities, that of Duchacek 
in 1988. In light of the substantive number of both existing and defunct dyadic federation as 
well as some major political changes that have taken place over the last thirty years (e.g., the 
breakup Czechoslovakia, the collapse of the former Yugolsavia and the independence of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina), there is a clear need to expand and to update the comparative discussion 
on the conditions leading to and/or facilitating the failure and successes of dyadic federations. 
The present chapter does so by mapping the institutional, geographic and economic realities for 
all democratic dyadic federations, past and present. In so doing, this chapter aims to identify in 
the presence of absence of which factors dyadic federal projects have succeeded and in which 
they have failed. 
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section clarifies the universe of cases 
under analysis, expands on what is meant by the ‘success’ and ‘failure’ of dyadic federations, 
and briefly discusses six key factors that have been identified as being potentially responsible 
for these outcomes. The second section presents the chapter’s methodological framework, 
operationalizes the six key factors, and provides the rationale of a fuzzy-set Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis that we use to perform a systematic cross-case comparison in order to 
draw logical inferences about the factors and combination of factors that are most likely to 
contribute to the success and failure of dyadic federations. The third section presents our 
findings in detail. In the chapter’s concluding section, we put these findings into broader 
perspective and set the stage for further studies on the prospects of federalism and power-
sharing in deeply diverse democracies. 
 
 
3 
Studying the Success and Failure of Dyadic Federations 
 
Three questions must be addressed as a preliminary step in understanding the success and 
failure of dyadic federations: (1) What cases can be considered as a dyadic federation and must 
therefore be included in this study? (2) What exactly is meant by the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of a 
dyadic federation? (3) And what factors we identify as potentially accounting for the success 
or failure of a dyadic federation?  
 
Establishing the universe of cases 
 
The defining feature of a dyadic federation is its bipolarity – both when it comes to its society 
and to its institutions. In societal terms, a dyadic federation’s population is composed of two 
major communities that are distinctly characterized by linguistic, cultural, historic and/or 
religious differences.1 To be clear, this does not mean that these two major communities must 
be the only ones on the state’s territory, but they should clearly be the politically dominant and 
must be substantively larger in population size than other groups. Along institutional lines, 
dyadic federations are characterized by institutionalized self- and/or shared-rule prerogatives 
(whether that be in the legislative, executive and/or judicial branch of government), 
corresponding to the two dominant communities’ self-determination projects.  In reflecting the 
literature’s use of these characteristics in reference to dyadic federations and, to a lesser degree, 
‘bipolar’, ‘bicommunal’ or ‘two-unit’ federations, we use these four terms interchangeably.2 
 Based on the foregoing definition, we employed three specific selection criteria in 
establishing a universe of cases of dyadic federations: 
1. Each case had to have two dominant communities represented in the institutional and socio-
political structure of the state.  
2. Each case had to have some form of accommodative communitarian mechanisms (formal or 
informal) within shared political organizations. Some of the cases that we selected were/are 
constitutionally federal, while others were/are characterized by other forms of federal power-
sharing.3 When cases had two major communities but had no (effective) federal or power-
sharing traits, they were not included in the study.4 
3. The cases under examination needed to be democracies. While this criterion is exogenous to 
the concept of dyadic federation per se, it was included to assure the comparability of cases. 
In determining what constitutes a democracy, we employed the Freedom House (2018) data 
and only included countries that were considered at least “partly free”.5 Some cases (such as 
                                                     
1 These differences may be manifest or, at least, “imagined” (Anderson, 1983). 
2 Some conceived ‘dyadic federations’ as polities made of exclusively two communities and called federations 
with other smaller groups beside the two major ones ‘bipolar’ instead (Burgess, 2006, pp. 110-117). We use these 
terms interchangeably because both dyadic and bipolar federations share the major political stake that lies at the 
heart of this paper: the survival of their federal state despite a high potential for centrifugal pressures in their 
bipolar federal society. 
3 For example, Trinidad and Tobago is formally a unitary state, but we consider the creation of the semi-
autonomous Tobago House of Assembly in 1980 as evidence of a federal accommodative mechanism. 
4 For example, the United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria (1958-1971) was entirely dominated by Egypt. 
Similarly, the power-sharing mechanisms in the Federation of Ethiopia and Eritrea (1952-1962) were prevented 
from entering into force by Ethiopia. 
5 Examples of dyadic federations that were excluded because of their insufficient level of democratization are 
Burundi, Cameroun, the Federation of Pakistan, Rwanda or Yemen. 
4 
the Fiji Islands and Tanzania) failed to meet this criterion in the past but have demonstrated 
democratic developments in recent years.  These cases were thus included in the study once 
they could be considered “partly free”. 
In following these three selection criteria, we identified 15 cases as democratic dyadic 
federations. They are listed in Table 1, below. 
 
  Table 1. The 15 democratic dyadic federations included in the study 
Polity 
Dominant socio-political groups  Federal mechanisms Degree of 
democratization 
(Freedom House) 
Largest group 
2nd largest 
group 
 Federal 
constitution 
Power-
sharing 
Belgium (1970-today) Dutch-speakers French-speakers  ● ● Free 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995-today) Bosniaks Serbs  ● ● Partly free 
Canada (1987-today) English-speakers French-speakers  ● ● Free 
Cyprus (1960-1974) Greek-Cypriots Turk-Cypriots   ● Free 
Czechoslovakia (1990-1992) Czechs Slovaks  ● ● Free 
Federation of Malaysia (1963-1965) Malays Singaporeans  ● ● Partly free* 
Fiji Islands (2014-today) Melanesians Indo-Fijians   ● Partly free 
Guyana (1966-today) Indo-Guyanese Afro-Guyanese   ● Free 
Northern Ireland (1998-today) Unionists Republicans   ● Free 
Saint-Kitts and Nevis (1983-today) Kittitians Nevisians  ● ● Free 
Senegambia (1982-1989) Senegalese Gambians  ● ● Partly free 
Serbia and Montenegro (2003-2006) Serbs Montenegrins  ● ● Free 
Suriname (1991-today) Hindustanis Creoles   ● Free 
Tanzania (1992-today) Tanganyikans Zanzibari   ● Partly free 
Trinidad and Tobago (1976-today) Indo-Trinidadian Afro-Trinidadian   ● Free 
● = present. * Not covered by the Freedom House index but considered partly free by the authors. 
 
Defining the ‘success’ and ‘failure’ of a dyadic federal project 
 
The objective of this study to identify in the presence or absence of which factors dyadic federal 
projects have succeeded and in which they have failed. By ‘success’, we mean the survival of 
a dyadic federation – i.e., its continued existence comprising both major communities. By 
‘failure’, we mean the breaking apart of a dyadic federation – i.e., its demise as a result of either 
its dissolution or the secession of one of the two major communities. Among the cases listed 
above, six ‘failed’ (Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, the Federation of Ethiopia, the Federation of 
Malaysia, Senegambia, and Serbia and Montenegro) while ten have ‘survived.’ 
Two caveats need to be mentioned about this conceptualization. First, one should note 
that between the survival and the breakup of a state, there may be multiple degrees of 
(in)stability. However, measuring such a fine-grained reality is unfortunately beyond the scope 
of the current analysis. Second, speaking about the survival and breakup of a state always entails 
some degree of normativity. Traditionally, state-survival has positive connotations while the 
‘break-up’ of a state has negative undertones. However, state-survival can be very problematic 
in the presence of unresolvable ethnic tensions (even if it is the only possible solution), just as 
state breakup can actually attenuate tensions between communities. In this study, our objective 
is primarily empirical and we do not attach any desirability to either of the outcomes a priori. 
We do nevertheless engage in making normative assessments when drawing conclusions from 
our empirical findings on the prospect of federalism (or particular aspects of it) as an appropriate 
institutional arrangement for bipolar polities. 
5 
Identifying the factors under analysis 
 
Existing research on dyadic federations in the form of single or small-n case studies provides a 
repository of factors that can potentially explain their survival or breakup.6 Based on a 
comprehensive review of this research,7 we have opted to include six factors in our comparative 
analysis: 
1. The degree to which groups are territorially concentrated; 
2. the degree of countrywide electoral proportionality; 
3. the degree of nationalization of the party system; 
4. the degree of inclusiveness in the state executive; 
5. the degree to which economic resources are equally distributed across groups; 
6. the amount of time that the dyadic federation has held together. 
 
1. Territorial concentration 
 
The first factor that we identified as potentially decisive for the survival of a dyadic federation 
is geographical in nature. In fact, one of the key concerns that needs to be resolved when 
dissolving a state or when dealing with the effects of secession is that of the borders between 
groups (Coakley, 2012, pp. 234-239). If an intra-state border between two communities is 
accepted by both of them, it may become an inter-state border following dissolution or 
secession. Conversely, if the communities’ populations are so intermingled that agreeing on a 
state border proves to be impossible, dissolution or secession may be impossible. Consequently, 
we expect ‘territorial heterogeneity’ to contribute to the survival of dyadic federations, while 
we expect ‘territorial homogeneity’ to contribute to its failure.  
 
2. Electoral proportionality 
 
The second factor that we identified relates to the voting system that is used for determining 
the representatives in the state legislature. Traditionally, the conflict literature is divided 
between consociationalists who argue in favour of a group-based representation (Lijphart, 1977, 
                                                     
6 For single case studies on Belgium, cf. Beaufays (1988), Reuchamps and Onclin (2009), Deschouwer (2012), 
Reuchamps (2013). On Bosnia and Herzegovina, cf. Bieber (2002, 2003), Keil (2016), Hulsey and Stjepanović 
(2017). On Canada, cf. Leslie (1988), Watts (2000), Gagnon (2006). On Cyprus, cf. Bryant (2011), Trimikliniotis 
and Bozkurt (2012), Salih (2013), Bahcheli and Noel (2013), Özgür, Köprülü, and Reuchamps (2019). On 
Czechoslovakia, cf. Innes (1997). On the Federation of Malaysia, cf. Josey (2013). On Fiji, cf. Fraenkel (2006), 
Fraenkel and Grofman (2006). On Guyana, cf. Hinds (2011). On Northern Ireland, cf. Ruane and Todd (1996), 
Taylor (2009). On Saint-Kitts and Nevis, cf. Premdas (1998), Midgett (2005). On Senegambia, cf. Hughes (1992) 
and Richmond (1993). On Serbia and Montenegro, cf. Fraser (2003), Kim (2006). On Suriname, cf. Hoefte (2013). 
On Tanzania, cf. Nassor and Jose (2014) and Cameron (2019). On Trinidad and Tobago, cf. Premdas (2002). For 
low-n comparisons on Belgium and Canada, cf. Karmis and Gagnon (1996), Erk and Gagnon (2000), Fournier and 
Reuchamps (2009), Reuchamps (2011), Reuchamps (2015). On Belgium and Bosnia and Herzegovina, cf. 
Stroschein (2003). On Czechoslovakia and Serbia and Montenegro, cf. Macek-Mackova (2011). On Fiji, Guyana 
and Malaysia, cf. Milne (1988). On Guyana and Suriname, cf. Singh (2008). On Guyana, Suriname and Trinidad 
and Tobago, cf. Ryan (2002). 
7 This study also situates itself against the backdrop of a literature on state failure, which has largely been devoted 
to the comparative study of conflict and divided polities (Roeder & Rothchild, 2005; Guelke, 2012) – from an 
institutional (Hale, 2004; Lijphart, 2004) or a peace-building perspective (Lederach, 1997; Oberschall, 2007). 
Bipolar polities have hitherto received much less of such systematic attention.  
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2004) and centripetalists who argue in favour of electoral incentives for cross-group vote 
pooling (Horowitz, 1993; Reilly, 2001). Both agree, however, that an electoral system should 
be as proportional as possible in order to prevent groups from feeling underrepresented (or 
others as overrepresented). Consequently, we expect a proportional electoral system to 
contribute to the survival of a dyadic federation, while we expect a non-proportional electoral 
system to contribute to its failure.  
 
3. Nationalization of the party system 
 
The third factor that we identified is the degree to which political parties are nationalized or 
regionalized – i.e., whether parties seek support on a statewide basis and across the dominant 
groups or whether they address the electorate of a single (region and) community only. This 
factor is closely related to the centripetal argument according to which parties that are 
institutionally obliged (or at least incentivized) to address a cross-community electorate will 
moderate their ethno-regional claims and, in so doing, contribute to greater statewide stability 
(Horowitz, 1993; Reilly, 2001). Consequently, one should expect a nationalized party system 
to contribute to the survival of a dyadic federation, while a regionalized party system can be 
expected to contribute to its failure.8  
 
4. Executive inclusiveness 
 
The fourth factor that we have identified relates to the representation of societal groups in the 
statewide executive. This factor is related to the consociational argument that all groups divided 
by politically salient cleavages should have guaranteed access to political power (Lijphart, 
1977, 2004; Reuchamps, 2007). While advocates recognize the risk of institutionally 
reinforcing existing societal divides, they argue that executive power-sharing will still have a 
pacifying effect because all societal groups feel represented in the body that executes the state’s 
major political decisions (Lijphart, 1995). Consequently, we expect the inclusion of the 
dominant groups in the statewide executive to contribute to the survival of a dyadic federation, 
while we expect their absence or exclusion from the statewide executive to contribute to the 
opposite outcome.9  
 
5. Equally distributed economic resources 
 
The fifth factor that we have identified as potentially decisive for the survival of a dyadic 
federation is economic in nature: the equal distribution of economic resources across groups. 
While the share of common wealth is an important issue in all societies (divided as well as 
undivided), it can be expected to be of even more importance in a dyadic federation where 
                                                     
8 To be clear, the degree of nationalization of a party system is influenced by the electoral system and, in a divided 
society, by the territorial overlap of voting constituencies and the residing area of different societal groups. 
Nevertheless, it is ultimately the party’s decision on how it decides to seek support. 
9 One should note that executive inclusiveness may be a formal constitutional requirement in some cases, while it 
may be a tacit historical, cultural or political arrangement in others (Reynolds & Reilly, 1999; Roeder & Rothchild, 
2005). 
7 
economic advantages of one community are very highly likely to also mean economic 
disadvantages for the other community (Elazar, 1988). More concretely, one can expect 
mutually reinforcing phenomena of greed – when the advantaged societal group does not want 
to share resources with the disadvantaged – and grievance – when the disadvantaged group feels 
deprived or dominated – to create instability (Gurr, 1993, 2015). Consequently, we expect that 
an equal distribution of economic resources across groups will contribute to the survival of a 
dyadic federation, while we should expect an unequal distribution of economic resources across 
groups to contribute to its failure10.  
 
6. Long duration of the dyadic union 
 
The sixth factor that we have identified relates to the duration of the dyadic union – i.e., the 
amount of time that the constituent units have shared the same state. Explaining the survival of 
a dyadic federation by the duration of its existence might seem tautological at first glance 
(Caluwaerts & Reuchamps, 2015). However, there are good reasons to believe that the duration 
of a federal arrangement can actually also greatly contribute to its survival.  Put another way, 
the breakup of a dyadic federation may become increasingly less likely over time because 
political institutions become integrated, because economic relations between the units become 
interdependent, or simply because populations have started to develop closer relations and/or 
shared beliefs. Consequently, we should expect failed dyadic federations to have been dyadic 
unions of short duration.  By contrast, we should expect successful dyadic federations to be 
either of long duration, if they are consolidated, or of short duration, if they are at their start. 
 
Mapping and Explaining Cross-Case Diversity: a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis 
 
The present chapter has two main objectives, one descriptive and one analytical. At a 
descriptive level, its objective is to map the political, geographic and economic context of 
dyadic federations, both past and present. In so doing, the chapter updates existing accounts, 
prepares the analytical step and provides raw data for future research. At an analytical level, its 
objective is to bring to light the combinations of factors in the presence or absence of which 
dyadic federations have succeeded and in which they have failed. Based on this analysis, the 
chapter seeks to inform the broader literature on federalism, national diversity and democracy 
regarding the near and longer-term prospects of federal arrangements in bipolar polities. To 
achieve this, we use a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis. This method allows for 
systematically mapping and comparing the identified factors across all fifteen dyadic 
federations. In this section, we discuss (a) how the six factors under examination have been 
translated into fuzzy-set conditions and how data has been collected for each of them, and (b) 
the rationale upon which the analysis is built. 
 
                                                     
10 One should note that the distribution of economic resources involves both the de facto repartition of natural and 
economic wealth as well as the distribution of economic resources through the intermediary of national 
redistribution mechanisms (Gordon & Cullen, 2012). 
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Operationalization of the conditions and data collection 
 
A Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is based on Boolean logic. It systematically 
compares ‘conditions’ that are calibrated as ‘crisp-sets’ or ‘fuzzy-sets’ (Berg-Schlosser, De 
Meur, Rihoux, & Ragin, 2009). Conditions are assessments of how much a phenomenon, in 
this case a factor, is present or absent in a given case (e.g., the degree to which electoral 
proportionality is present in Belgium). In set-theoretic terms, conditions assess how much a 
case belongs to a given set that is defined vis-à-vis a concept (e.g., the degree to which Belgiums 
belong to the set of electorally proportional countries) (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). While 
crisp-sets assess conditions dichotomously and only allow for differentiations in kind (presence 
(1) vs. absence (0) of a condition), fuzzy-sets are fine-grained assessments of conditions 
(calibrated as ratios from 0.00 - 1.00) and allow for differentiations in both kind (0.50 being the 
discriminating point) and degree (e.g., 0.60 < 0.80). 
As summarized in Table 2, the six factors identified above have been translated into 
conditions and were calibrated as 4-point fuzzy-sets: 1.00 for the ‘full presence’ of the factor in 
a case, 0.67 when it was ‘rather present,’ 0.33 when it was ‘rather not present’ and 0.00 when 
it was ‘fully absent.’ An outcome condition accounting for whether a dyadic federation survived 
or broke up was calibrated as crisp-set: 1 when the federation survived, 0 when it broke up. 
 
Table 2. Operationalization of the conditions as fuzzy-sets 
Label Conditions Fuzzy scale Operationalization 
OUTC 
Survival/Breakup of the 
dyadic federation 
2-point 
(crisp-set) 
Qualitative assessment: 
Survival = 1, breakup = 0. 
TER.CON Territorial concentration 4-point 
Qualitative assessment: 
Fully separable = 1, rather separable = 0.67, rather not 
separable = 0.33, fully not separable = 0. 
ELC.PROP Electoral proportionality 4-point 
Mean score on Gallagher Index: 
Anchors: 0-4 = 0.00, 5-9 = 0.33, 10-14 = 0.67, 15-20 = 
1.00. 
NAT.P.SYS Nationalized party system 4-point 
Qualitative assessment: 
Fully national = 1, rather national = 0.67, rather not 
national = 0.33, fully not national = 0. 
EXE.INC Executive inclusiveness 4-point 
Qualitative assessment: 
Perfect cabinet share = 1, significant share = 0.67, 
ineffective share = 0.33, no share = 0. 
EQ.ECO.DIS 
Equal economic 
distribution 
4-point 
Quantitative (GDP) and qualitative assessment: 
Largely equal = 1, minor inequalities = 0.67, 
substantive inequalities = 0.33, major inequal. = 0. 
LG.DUR 
Long duration of the 
union 
4-point 
Quantitative assessment with observation-based 
anchors: 
≥ 30 years = 1, ≥ 20 years = 0.67, ≥ 10 years = 0.33, 
< 10 years = 0. 
 
The assessment of a case’s territorial concentration was made qualitatively by the authors. 
A case was considered ‘fully separable’ when the dominant communities lived in territorially 
homogenous areas that could be separated by a clear line. The case was considered ‘rather 
separable’ when there was some territorial heterogeneity between the communities but when a 
9 
clear line could still be drawn. The case was considered ‘rather not separable’ when this line 
could not clearly be drawn. And, the case was considered ‘fully not separable’ when 
communities were highly dispersed territorially and no clear line could be drawn. 
The assessment of a case’s electoral proportionality was made using the Gallagher Index 
(Gallagher, 2018).11 More specifically, cases’ mean Gallagher score was taken for all lower 
house elections with available data.12 During calibration, a Gallagher score of 0-4 was translated 
into 0.00, a score of 5-9 was translated into 0.33, a score of 10-14 was translated into 10-14, 
and a score of 15-20 was translated into 1.00. 
The assessment of a case’s degree of party system nationalization was made qualitatively 
by the authors. A case was considered ‘fully national’ when the party system was exclusively 
national. A case was considered ‘rather national’ when the system was predominantly national. 
A case was considered ‘rather not national’ when the system was predominantly regional. A 
case was considered ‘fully not national’ when the system was exclusively regional. 
The assessment of a case’s executive inclusiveness was also made qualitatively by the 
authors. A case was considered ‘fully inclusive’ in the presence of an (almost) perfect (or equal) 
sharing of the cabinet between the two dominant communities. A case was considered ‘rather 
inclusive’ when there was a significant sharing of the cabinet between communities. A case 
was considered ‘rather not inclusive’ when the sharing of the cabinet proved to be ineffective 
(e.g., in Fiji where the political party representing one community often refuses to sit in the 
cabinet with a political party representing the other community). A case was considered ‘fully 
not inclusive’ when there was no sharing whatsoever of the cabinet between communities. 
The assessment of a case’s economic distribution was made both quantitatively and 
qualitatively by the authors. When available, the GDP per capita of both dominant communities 
was compared. In the absence of data, secondary sources (cf. supra) were used to classify each 
polity. A case was considered ‘largely equal’ when both groups could be considered of 
generally equal wealth. A case was considered to have ‘rather equal’ when small wealth 
inequalities were observed. A case was considered ‘rather not equal’ when there was a non-
negligible difference in wealth between communities. And, a case was considered to be ‘fully 
not equal’ when a clear wealth difference between communities was observed. 
Finally, the assessment of the duration of a case's intactness was made quantitatively 
using observation-based anchors. When mapping the number of years that the case under 
examination remained intact (cf. the Appendix),13 three gaps tended to appear and were thus 
used to set the qualitative anchors. Cases that remained intact for over 30 years were deemed 
to be of ‘long duration’. Cases that remained intact for 20-29 years were deemed to be of ‘rather 
                                                     
11 The Gallagher Index or ‘least squares index’ calculates the degree of electoral proportionality by taking the 
square-root of the half of the sum of all parties’ squared difference between their share of votes and share of seats 
for one election: 𝐿𝑠𝑞 =  √
1
2
∑ (% 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖 − % 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠𝑖)2
𝑛
𝑖=1 . 
12 For Belgium, Canada, Guyana, Saint-Kitts and Nevis, Serbia and Montenegro, Suriname, and Trinidad and 
Tobago, calculations were borrowed from Gallagher (2018). For Bosnia and Herzegovina, Czechoslovakia, 
Cyprus, Fiji, the Federation of Malaysia, Nigeria, Northern Ireland, Senegambia and Tanzania, calculations were 
made by the authors. 
13 We considered the number of years during which the case qualified for our three selection criteria, even though 
some cases remained together even longer. We did so because centrifugal dynamics might only come up when 
power-sharing agreements are entrenched and when states are democratic. Our findings remain even robust, 
however, even when considering longer periods. 
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long duration’. Cases that remained intact for 10-19 years were deemed to be of ‘rather short 
duration’. And cases that remained intact for less than 10 years were deemed to be of ‘short 
duration’. 
When applying this operationalization and calibrating the collected data on all factors for 
the fifteen dyadic federation under examination, we obtained the final data distribution 
displayed in Table 3, below. 
 
Table 3. Data distribution on the six conditions and the outcome for all 15 dyadic federations 
ID Cases TER.CON ELC.PROP NAT.P.SYS EXE.INC EQ.ECO.DIS LG.DUR OUTC 
BEL Belgium (1970-today) 0.33 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.33 1.00 1 
BAH Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995-today) 0.33 0.67 0.00 0.67 0.33 0.67 1 
CAN Canada (1987-today) 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.67 1.00 1 
CYP Cyprus (1960-1974) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.33 0 
CZE Czechoslovakia (1990-1992) 1.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 
MAL Federation of Malaysia (1963-1965) 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 
FIJ Fiji Islands (2014-today) 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.00 1 
GUY Guyana (1966-today) 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.00 0.67 1.00 1 
NIR Northern Ireland (1998-today) 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.67 1 
SKN Saint-Kitts and Nevis (1983-today) 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.33 1.00 1 
SGB Senegambia (1982-1989) 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.33 0.00 0 
SAM Serbia and Montenegro (2003-2006) 1.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 
SUR Suriname (1991-today) 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.67 1 
TZN Tanzania (1992-today) 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.67 1.00 0.67 1 
TAT Trinidad and Tobago (1976-today) 0.00 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.33 1.00 1 
 
Rationale of the fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis14 
 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) has an equifinal, asymmetrical and constellational 
view of causality. It is equifinal in that it understands outcomes as being (potentially) produced 
by multiple distinct factors. It is asymmetrical in that it understands factors that explain the 
presence of an outcome as not necessarily explaining its absence when they are negated. And 
it is constellational in that it explicitly looks for the occurrence of outcomes in the presence or 
absence of multiple conditions that are linked by a logical AND or OR. 
Drawing on Boolean logic,15 QCA systematically compares cases’ condition scores and 
their outcome. The analysis is based on the so-called ‘truth table’ which comprises all 
combinations of present or absent conditions that are observed in the cases, together with the 
respective outcome. When conditions are operationalized as fuzzy sets, cases have partial 
membership in truth table rows (equal to their lowest membership in one of the conditions) and 
eventually belong to the only row in which their membership is higher than 0.50. The truth table 
is both a descriptive and analytical tool. It is descriptive in that it allows us to map all existing 
constellations of conditions and the outcome with which they are associated. It is analytical in 
that it allows us to determine which (combination of) conditions appear to be necessary and/or 
sufficient for an outcome to occur, and how combinations of conditions can be minimized as to 
obtain the most parsimonious solution for explaining an outcome (cf. infra). 
                                                     
14 This section draws on Ragin and Rihoux (2009) and Schneider and Wagemann (2012). 
15 The Boolean operators used in this chapter are the logical AND (*), the logical OR (+), the logical negation (~) 
and the logical implication (→). 
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In an analysis of necessity, one determines the degree to which (a combination of) 
conditions are (is) consistently present when the outcome occurs. In crisp-set terms, for it to be 
necessary one always wants condition X to be present when outcome Y occurs. When using 
fuzzy-sets, one wants cases’ membership in X to be higher than their membership in Y. The 
‘consistency’ of necessity (i.e., the extent to which a condition is necessary) is obtained by 
∑ min (𝑋𝑖, 𝑌𝑖)
𝐼
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑌𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1
. One also assesses how many cases are ‘covered’ by a necessary condition (i.e., 
the share of cases for which the condition is necessary). The coverage of necessity is obtained 
by 
∑ min (𝑋𝑖, 𝑌𝑖)
𝐼
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑋𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1
. 
In an analysis of sufficiency, one determines to what degree an outcome is always present 
when a (combination of) condition(s) is present. In crisp-set terms, for it to be sufficient one 
always wants outcome Y to occur when condition X is present. When using fuzzy-sets, one 
wants cases’ membership in Y to be higher than their membership in X. The ‘consistency’ of 
sufficiency (i.e., the extent to which a condition is sufficient) is obtained by 
∑ min (𝑋𝑖, 𝑌𝑖)
𝐼
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑋𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1
. One 
also assesses how many cases are ‘covered’ by a sufficient condition (i.e., the share of cases for 
which the condition is sufficient). The coverage of sufficiency is obtained by 
∑ min (𝑋𝑖, 𝑌𝑖)
𝐼
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑌𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1
. 
When it comes to finding the most parsimonious solution that explains (is sufficient for) 
an outcome, the so-called ‘minimization process’ is involved. Based on the Quine-McClusky 
algorithm, ‘similar conjunctions’ are matched so that conditional specifications that logically 
lead to identical outcomes are excluded.16 In addition, ‘logically redundant prime implicants’ 
(i.e., terms that are logically implied twice in a formula) are equally excluded.17 This reduction 
potential is limited when the number of possible configurations (i.e., combinations of 
conditions) exceeds the actual number of observed configurations. Non-observed 
configurations (so-called logical remainders) reduce the number of occurring similar 
conjunctions and hence the possibilities of minimization. Given that a fcQCA with six fuzzy-
sets involves 64 possible configurations,18 but that the present one only comprises 11 observed 
configurations (cf. infra), ‘simplifying assumptions’ about the outcome of non-observed cases 
will be made by combining observed data with theoretical reasoning. This allows for further 
and final minimization. One should note that since QCA has an asymmetric view of causality, 
the occurrence and non-occurrence of the outcome have to be analysed separately. 
 
When Dyadic Federations Have Succeeded and When They Have Failed 
 
The fsQCA analyses suggest that dyadic federations survived when the dominant communities 
were territorially dispersed and had, at the same time, either a proportional electoral system or 
a nationalized party system. In the absence of territorial dispersion, other institutional 
arrangements such as executive inclusiveness and an equal economic distribution appear to be 
important. In general, the analysis shows that dyadic federations that survive do so for many 
                                                     
16 E.g., if A*B*C → D and if, A*B*~C → D, then A*B → D and the formula can be reduced. 
17 E.g., if A*B*C + A*B*~C + ~A*B*C + ~A*~B*C → D, then A*B + ~A*C → D. 
18 For n fuzzy-sets, the total number of possible configurations is 2n. In this case, 26 = 64. 
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years.  By contrast, our results suggest that a dyadic federal project is likely to fail in the absence 
of stabilizing institutional factors like electoral proportionality and a national party system, 
especially when economic resources are unequally distributed between groups and when they 
are territorially clearly separable. The (short) duration of the union is important too. Table 4, 
below, displays the truth table upon which these results are based.19 
 
Table 4. Truth table for the fsQCA analysis 
TER.CON ELC.PROP NAT.P.SYS EXE.INC EQ.ECO.DIS LG.DUR OUTC 
Incl. 
Cases 
Prs. Abs. 
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1.000 0.000 BEL, BAH, NOI 
0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1.000 0.000 GUY, SUR 
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1.000 0.000 CAN 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1.000 0.000 FIJ 
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1.000 0.000 SKN 
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1.000 0.000 TZN 
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.834 0.166 TAT 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.142 0.858 MAL 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.198 0.802 CZS, SAM 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.330 0.670 SGB 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.330 0.670 CYP 
 
When have dyadic federations succeeded? 
 
The analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions for the survival of dyadic federations 
(outcome = 1), summarized in Table 5, below, suggests that no condition is, on its own, truly 
necessary but that a few come close to or even reach sufficiency. Concerning necessity, one can 
see that most surviving dyadic federations are of long duration (nine out of ten) and that they 
are composed of territorially non-concentrated groups (eight out of ten). Consequently, both 
seem to be important contextual conditions for preventing the breaking apart of a dyadic 
federation. One should note, however, that neither of these conditions is fully necessary because 
two dyadic federations survived despite having territorially concentrated groups (Canada and 
Tanzania), and one survived although it is only a recent democratic dyadic federal project (Fiji). 
For the former, we will see that other stabilizing factors have been at work. For the latter, one 
should note that, despite democracy had only been achieved recently, the common state history 
of both groups dates back much longer. When looking at the sufficiency, one can see that the 
survival rate of dyadic federations is fairly high (not to say perfect) when they are of long 
duration (9/9), have an equal economic distribution between groups (4/4), have a nationalized 
party system (1/1) or a proportional electoral system (7/9).20 This shows that these are important 
stabilizing factors in bipolar federal settings. However, their importance comes in combination 
with other factors as the constellational analysis below suggests. 
                                                     
19 An inclusiveness threshold of 0.67 has been chosen for a case to be included in the analysis. While this comes 
with some deviance in degree (depending on cases’ membership scores in the conditions), no row comprised 
deviance in kind (all cases were member of the same outcome) and all cases could be included in the analysis. 
20 The consistency of sufficiency does not reach 1.000 because of some deviance in degree (remember that these 
are fuzzy-sets). 
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Table 5. Consistency and coverage scores for conditions’ necessity and 
sufficiency for explaining the survival of dyadic federations (Outc. = 1) 
Analysis Condition Consistency Coverage RoN PRI 
Necessity 
LG.DUR 0.768 0.959 0.955 - 
~TER.CON 0.767 0.885 0.864 - 
Sufficiency 
NAT.P.SYS 1.000 0.265 - 1.000 
LG.DUR 0.959 0.768 - 0.959 
EQ.ECO.DIS 0.938 0.499 - 0.938 
ELC.PROP 0.845 0.733 - 0.845 
EXE.INC 0.750 0.401 - 0.750 
* Only conditions whose consistency of necessity or sufficiency exceeds 0.75 are 
presented. 
 
Three constellations can be identified when exploring the combination of conditions 
under which dyadic federations have survived, as we can see in Table 6, below.21 Six out of the 
ten surviving dyadic federations had territorially non-concentrated groups and a proportional 
electoral system (1.A). One out of the ten surviving dyadic federations had territorially non-
concentrated groups, a nationalized party system and was of long duration (1.B). Two out of 
the ten surviving dyadic federations had an inclusive executive, an equal economic distribution 
and lasted over time (1.C). This confirms the importance of territorial heterogeneity and shows 
that it is usually combined with another stabilizing mechanism – electoral proportionality or a 
nationalized party system. Besides, the territorially concentrated cases with a nationalized party 
system have also been of long duration. Something that the territorially concentrated cases with 
a proportional electoral system will probably be in a few years. These two paths are perfectly 
consistent and cover together 70% of the cases. In two cases, however, none of these factors 
 
Table 6. Minimized conjunctions explaining the survival of dyadic federations (Outc. = 1) 
Solution 1  2 
Path A B C  A 
Territorial concentration ⊗ ⊗   ⊗ 
Electoral proportionality ⚫     
Nationalized party system  ⚫    
Executive inclusiveness   ⚫   
Equal economic distribution   ⚫   
Duration of the union ( ⚫ ) ⚫ ⚫  ⚫ 
Consistency 1.000 1.000 1.000  0.948 
Raw coverage 0.600 0.232 0.233  0.601 
Unique coverage 0.369 0.067 0.101  0.601 
Covered cases 
BEL, BAH, FIJ, 
GUY, NOI, SUR 
SKN CAN, TZN 
 BEL, BAH, GUY, NOI, 
SKN, SUR, TAT 
Contradictory cases - - -  CYP (in degree) 
Solution consistency 1.000  0.948 
Solution coverage 0.768  0.601 
Non-covered cases TAT  CAN, TAN, FIJ 
 
                                                     
21 The minimization process of solution 1.A relied on six, that of 1.B on seven, and that of 1.C on six simplifying 
assumptions. They were based on the directional expectation that conditions(0,1,1,1,1,-) → outcome(1). 
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was present (Canada and Tanzania). Instead, their survival occurred in the presence of inclusive 
executives and an equal distribution of economic resources between groups, in addition to the 
fact that they had been of long duration. Finally, there is one surviving case which corresponds 
to none of these constellations, Trinidad and Tobago, and which is surprising insofar as its only 
stabilizing factors were territorial heterogeneity and a long duration (2.A). These two factors 
achieve a high sufficiency across all cases (7/7)22 and even cover 70% of the surviving 
federations. But given that they are present only in a single case, we are cautious with 
overinterpreting their sufficiency and suggest a deeper investigation of the stability of Trinidad 
and Tobago, which is beyond the scope of the current analysis. 
Figure 1, below, provides some additional information on the situation of the cases vis-à-
vis the three main solution formulas. Guyana, Fiji, Northern Ireland and Suriname are the most 
typical cases for solution 1.A in that they were full members of both the conjunction and the 
outcome. Belgium and Bosnia and Herzegovina are still typical cases but have a slightly lower 
(though positive) membership in the conjunction. Solution 1.B and 1.C have no most typical 
cases (i.e., no full conjunction members), but Saint Kitt and Nevis, and Canada and Tanzania 
are the respective typical cases. As noted above, Trinidad and Tobago is the only case that is 
covered by none of these three solutions and is therefore deviant in coverage. Finally, Cyprus, 
Czechoslovakia, the Federation of Malaysia, Senegambia and Serbia and Montenegro are 
negative cases because they did not survive and can therefore not provide relevant information 
for the analysis of survival, except for their presence as logical counterfactuals. These cases are 
analysed in the following sub-section.  
 
Figure 1. XY-Plot for the paths of the main solution explaining the survival of dyadic federations (Outc. = 1) 
 
* Legend: a = Most typical cases. b = Typical cases. c = Deviant cases in coverage. d = Deviant cases in consistency. e = Negative (irrelevant) cases. 
 
When have dyadic federations failed? 
 
The analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions for the breakup of dyadic federations 
(outcome = 0), summarized in Table 7, below, suggests that four conditions appear a priori to 
be close to necessary for the outcome to occur, while none is sufficient, on its own. Concerning 
necessity, one can see that most dyadic federations that broke up had a regionalized party 
                                                     
22 The consistency of sufficiency does not reach 1.000 because of some deviance in degree. 
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system (5/5), were of short duration (5/5), had an unequal economic distribution between 
communities (5/5) and had territorially concentrated communities (4/5). While all of these 
conditions seem thus to be important for understanding when dyadic federations break up, one 
should note that the first three have low relevance of necessity scores (probably coming with 
the limited diversity of their distribution), while the last one has a contradicting case. None of 
these conditions can therefore be considered truly necessary. Furthermore, no single condition 
is on its own sufficient to explain the breaking apart of a dyadic federation. 
 
Table 7. Consistency and coverage scores for conditions’ necessity and 
sufficiency for explaining the breakup of dyadic federations (Outc. = 0) 
Analysis Condition Consistency Coverage RoN PRI 
Necessity 
~NAT.P.SYS 1.000 0.405 0.265 - 
~LG.DUR 0.934 0.668 0.476 - 
~EQ.ECO.DIS 0.934 0.482 0.515 - 
TER.CON 0.800 0.632 0.788 - 
Sufficiency - - - - - 
* Only conditions whose consistency of necessity or sufficiency exceeds 0.75 are 
presented. 
 
Two constellations can be identified when looking for the combination of conditions 
under which dyadic federations have broken apart, as we can see in Table 8, below.23 Four out 
of the five these dyadic federations had territorially concentrated groups, a regionalized party 
system, an unequal economic distribution between groups and were of short duration (1.A). 
Together, these factors achieve (almost)24 perfect sufficiency (4/4). The only case not covered 
by this solution is Cyprus because its groups used to be territorially non-concentrated. The 
evidence suggests that the breaking apart of the latter occurred in the presence of a 
 
Table 8. Minimized conjunctions explaining the breakup of dyadic 
federations (Outc. = 0) 
Solution 1 
Path A B 
Territorial concentration ⚫  
Electoral proportionality  ⊗ 
Nationalized party system ⊗ ⊗ 
Executive inclusiveness   
Equal economic distribution ⊗ ⊗ 
Duration of the union ⊗ ⊗ 
Consistency 0.918 0.901 
Raw coverage 0.734 0.600 
Unique coverage 0.268 0.134 
Covered cases CZS, MAL, SGB, SAM CYP, MAL, SGB 
Contradictory cases BAH (in degree) BAH (in degree) 
Solution consistency 0.929 
Solution coverage 0.868 
Non-covered cases - 
                                                     
23 The minimization process of solution 1.A relied on one and that of 1.B on two simplifying assumptions. They 
were based on the directional expectation that conditions(1,0,0,0,0,0) → outcome(0). 
24 The consistency of sufficiency does not reach 1.000 because of some deviance in degree. 
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disproportional electoral system, a regionalized party system, an unequal economic distribution 
between groups and a (rather) short duration (1.B, which were also present in the Malaysian 
and Senegambian cases). However, one should note that the Cypriot case is somewhat particular 
insofar as both its dominant groups were kin-minorities of larger external states, Greece and 
Turkey, and that these states had a major responsibility for the escalation of tensions between 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots (enforcing at some point the territorial homogeneity). The proposed 
solution therefore has to be read jointly with this external kin-state influence. 
Figure 2, below, provides some additional information on the situation of the cases vis-à-
vis the two solution formulas. Czechoslovakia, the Federation of Malaysia, and Serbia and 
Montenegro are most typical cases for solution 1.A in that they are both full members of the 
conjunction and the outcome. Senegambia is also typical but has a slightly lower (though 
positive) membership in the conjunction. Cyprus, as explained before, is deviant in coverage, 
because it is not covered by the conjunction. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a negative case but 
slightly deviates in consistency because it has partial membership in the conjunction (0.33).25 
The remaining cases are negative in both the outcome and conjunction. For solution 1.B, the 
Federation of Malaysia is the most typical case, while Cyprus and Senegambia are typical. 
Malaysia and Czechoslovakia are not covered. Bosnia and Herzegovina deviates again slightly 
in consistency. 
 
Figure 2. XY-Plot for the paths of the main solution explaining the breakup of dyadic 
federations (Outc. = 0) 
 
* Legend: a = Most typical cases. b = Typical cases. c = Deviant cases in coverage. d = Deviant cases in 
consistency. e = Negative (irrelevant) cases. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has brought to light and further explored in the presence or absence of which 
factors dyadic federal projects have succeeded (i.e., survived) and in which they have failed 
(i.e., broken apart). By mapping the factors that seem crucial for their stability, we provided an 
                                                     
25 In some way, the Bosnian case confirms the importance of kin-state influence already underlined for Cyprus. 
Here, however, kin-state presence served stability since Serbia is one of the guarantors of the Dayton peace 
agreement, together with the external conditionality ensured by the European Union. 
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expanded and updated account of the institutional, geographic and economic contexts of dyadic 
federations. By systematically comparing the importance of these factors with a fuzzy-set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis of all democratic dyadic federations, past and present, the 
chapter also offered a unique comprehensive comparative assessment in a field that has tended 
to focus on single case studies or on small-n comparisons. 
 Our results inform the broader literature on federalism, national diversity and 
democracy by showing, like Duchacek (1988, p. 31), that federalism is not per se an 
institutional arrangement likely to fail in bipolar polities, as suggested by Watts (2008, p. 184) 
for example. Overall, the analysis shows that federal projects with two major communities can 
succeed if geographical factors such as the territorial dispersion of the dominant groups play in 
its favour and when the presence of institutional arrangements (i.e., a proportional electoral 
system or a national party system) either ensure fair political representation for both 
communities or prevent polities from being conceived in exclusively sub-national terms. In the 
absence of territorial dispersion, other institutional arrangements such as executive 
inclusiveness and an equal economic distribution between groups appear to be crucial in 
preventing the breakup of the federation. In general, dyadic federations that survive tend to do 
so for many years and one can reasonably expect that if a dyadic federal project makes it a few 
years (~20), it will make it many years. By contrast, the analysis shows that a bipolar federal 
project is likely to fail in the absence of stabilizing institutional arrangements (i.e., electoral 
proportionality and a national party system) and, more particularly, when economic resources 
are unequally distributed between communities and when these communities are clearly 
separable territorially speaking. The duration of the union is, again, of importance because the 
dyadic federations who failed did so at their very beginning.  
Just to be clear, based on these findings, we are not arguing that the survival of a dyadic 
federation is inherently a good thing. Instead we argue that, under the aforementioned 
conditions, federalism can be a successful institutional arrangement for a bipolar polity when 
its survival as a state is desired or without a viable alternative. 
These findings have several implications for existing and future studies. First, the findings 
reaffirm the necessity for political scientists to pay attention to the geographic particularities of 
the territory they are studying (Coakley, 2012). That the stabilizing potential of political 
geography is often imposed rather than chosen can be interpreted as yet another paradox of 
democratic peace. Second, the findings cut through the debate between consociationalists and 
centripetalists in that both approaches could probably live with our findings. It appears indeed 
that group-based (executive inclusiveness), cross-group (national party systems) and mixed 
accommodative mechanisms (electoral proportionality) all contribute to the stability of dyadic 
federations, and that even for the latter, consociationalism and centripetalism might be ‘rather 
friends than foes’ (Bogaards, 2019). Third, the ‘political economy of regionalism’ (Keating, 
2013) is a concept that can very well be applied to the study of dyadic federation when an equal 
distribution of economic resources is envisioned as a stabilizing factor preventing both greed 
and grievance (Gurr, 1993, 2015). Finally, the analysis shows that there seems to be something 
like a ‘seven-year itch’ for dyadic federations. Among the five failed federations identified in 
this study, four broke up within seven years (Czechoslovakia, the Federation of Malaysia, 
Senegambia, and Serbia and Montenegro). Only Cyprus made it a little longer (14 years) and 
may have perhaps remained intact longer without external kin-state influence (cf. supra).  
18 
Before fully concluding this study, two nuances are necessary. First, while the explanation 
of when dyadic federations survived relied on a rather solid set of cases that was well distributed 
on the different conditions, the number of cases explaining when dyadic federations broke up 
is somewhat limited. Therefore, counterfactual reasoning for this group of cases was not 
possible in some instances and the accompanying conclusions should be thus interpreted 
accordingly. Secondly, the cases under study are not immovable realities and even if political 
engineering solutions are path-dependent (Pierson, 2000), this does not discount the possibility 
of exogenous shocks or of endogenous conditions changing extremely fast and deeply. After 
all, between Duchacek’s study in 1988 and today, quite a few cases evolved and some in quite 
dramatic ways. Needless to say that other cases might also evolve in the future. 
It is not necessary though to wait for these changes to occur in order to continue studying 
dyadic federations.  In light of the present findings, future studies might for instance want to 
dig further into particular cases like Trinidad and Tobago (to explain why this federation did 
not break up despite what one would have expected from a comparative perspective). 
Additionally, this study’s findings also open the possibility for a comparison with non-dyadic 
federations or bipolar polities without federal power-sharing agreements with the aim of 
assessing the prospects of dyadic federalism vis-à-vis alternative institutional arrangements or 
contexts. We hope that this chapter paved some of the way to these and other potential studies 
on the prospects of federalism and power-sharing arrangements in deeply diverse democracies. 
 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix 1. Number of years that the cases remained intact as of today 
 
* S = succeeded, F = failed. 
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